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Celebrated as a genius by many, dismissed as a monomaniacal crank by others, H. G. Wells 
(1866-1946) was once hard to ignore. Most famous today as one of the founders of modern 
science fiction, during the first half of the twentieth century he was known throughout the world 
as an audacious and controversial political thinker. Questions of global order were central to his 
work. From the opening decade of the century until the close of the Second World War he 
campaigned tirelessly for the eradication of the system of sovereign states and the creation of a 
new order, characterised by universal peace and justice. He was the twentieth century’s most 
prolific, original and influential advocate of the world-state.  
 
While omnipresent before the Second World War, Wells’s star waned rapidly. Even as millions 
continued to marvel at his “scientific romances,” his political writings were largely forgotten. The 
evolving discipline of International Relations (IR), fighting for credibility in the rapid post-war 
expansion of the social sciences, and shaped by the power dynamics of the Cold War, had little 
time for such a protean writer. There have been exceptions to this general rule. In 1950, for 
example, the eminent strategist Edward Mead Earle published an acute analysis of Wells’s 
political thinking. He was, Mead wrote in the pages of World Politics, a “mercurial and versatile 
genius” who had “exercised an almost unique influence on the generation which reached 
maturity during the decade 1910-20” (1950, 181, 185). But few other scholars followed Earle’s 
lead.  
 
Today Wells’s writings about global politics are usually either ignored or mentioned only in 
passing. He makes fleeting appearances in some intellectual histories of twentieth century 
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internationalism and globalism (e.g. Ashworth 1999; Mazower 2009; Rosenboim 2016, 211-16), 
and his ideas about human rights are occasionally subjected to scrutiny (e.g. Partington 2007; 
Planinc 2016). Unsurprisingly, he is frequently hailed by scholars cataloguing ideas about the 
world state (Cabrera 2010, 520; Craig 2008, 133; Weiss 2009, 260). For many years W. Warren 
Wagar’s H. G. Wells and the World State (1961) was the most comprehensive account of his 
international thought, though it has recently been supplemented by the work of John Partington 
(2003a). Both make bold claims about Wells’s importance as a political thinker. Partington, for 
example, argues that he “promoted, years ahead of his time, many of the internationalist policies 
and realities of the post-1945 period,” and in particular that he was the first to develop a 
theoretical account of international functionalism (2003b, 234). Among contemporary IR 
scholars, Daniel Deudney (2001, 2008) has demonstrated the most interest in Wells, writing 
insightfully about him as a pivotal thinker of post-Westphalian order. The “breadth and 
originality of Wells’s world order prophecies,” he claims, “were unmatched by any writer of the 
era” (2001, 203).  
 
None of this scholarship, valuable as it is, provides an adequate analysis of the early development 
of Wells’s vision of world order, and in particular of his shape-shifting account of the “English-
speaking” peoples and the British empire. Yet this was one of his preoccupations during the 
Edwardian years, and he spent much time debating it with some of the leading imperial thinkers 
and politicians of the day. Wells saw both the “English-speaking peoples” and the empire as 
potential agents of world transformation, even as institutional foundations for a universal state, 
though he struggled to work out how they might be reconciled. In this essay I explore his 
evolving attempts to imagine a future world in the years before the First World War, the period 
during which he attained global fame as a political thinker and produced some of his most 
innovative and influential work. In doing so, I offer a new interpretation of the political thought 




The fin de siècle was a key moment in the evolution of global politics. Deudney terms it the 
“global industrial period.” The industrial revolution, he contends, was a “primal development,” 
as new technologies deepened interactions across the planet. “As the scale and tempo of human 
affairs changed, a major and tumultuous reordering of large-scale political relationships and 
institutions seemed imminent and inevitable” (2008, 215, 219; see also Buzan & Lawson, 2015, 
67-96). Questions of “polity ontology” moved centre stage. Contemporary thinkers propagated 
endless plans for transcending the state system, including pan-regional imperial structures, 
European union, the federation of the British empire, and a world state.1 Numerous 
commentators regarded the (re)unification of the British colonial empire and the United States as 
the harbinger of a brighter future, one in which the “Anglo-Saxon race” or “English-speaking 
Peoples” could order and police the world (Bell 2014; 2017b). Wells was foremost among them. 
In 1901 he published Anticipations, the book that made his name as a prophet. In it, he predicted 
the emergence of a “New Republic” centred on the “synthesis” of Britain and the United States. 
This polity would govern a globe-straddling empire dedicated to “civilising” backward peoples, 
and it would serve as the basis for a future world state. But Wells soon came to realise that the 
British empire and the Anglo-American New Republic were potentially incompatible. 
 
To examine the early development of Wells’s political thought, I explore the character and 
purpose of his arguments about empire, race and Anglo-American union, the theoretical 
assumptions that underpinned them, and the early twentieth century intellectual and political 
                                                          
1 On early twentieth century attempts to envision post-Westpahlian political formations, see Bell 
(2007); Conrad & Sachsenmaier (2007); Long (1991); Wilson (2003).  
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debates he sought to shape.2 I draw extensively on Wells’s work, both published and 
unpublished, as well as the writings of his interlocutors. The first three sections of the article 
follow a broad chronological arc, tracing Wells’s mutating conception of the “New Republic.” 
Section I reconstructs Wells’s initial account, articulated principally in Anticipations. Section II 
examines the ontological basis of this imagined polity. Focusing on Mankind in the Making, 
published in 1903, and A Modern Utopia, which appeared in 1905, I argue that he grounded it in 
language rather than race. Wells was adamant that the “English-speaking peoples” not the 
“Anglo-Saxons” furnished the basis of unity. However, he never managed to escape the 
imaginative pull of global racial hierarchy, and despite his ostensible critique of race science his 
account of the New Republic reinscribed a racialized geopolitical vision. Section III identifies an 
important but unacknowledged shift in Wells’s position that occurred in the following years, and 
which is most apparent in his 1906 volume The Future in America. Silently dropping his support 
for formal Anglo-American union, he promoted instead a looser co-operative arrangement. I 
argue that Wells rejected the “Larger Synthesis” for two reasons: first, he realised that the British 
empire was a bar to reunion with the United States, and second, he discerned a ubiquitous 
“state-blindness” among American citizens, an unwillingness to acknowledge the significance of 
state institutions in underwriting individual freedom, political stability and economic 
productivity. The final section analyses his involvement in Edwardian debates over the British 
imperial order. I show that he regarded the empire as a potential foundation for the creation of a 
world state, and I explore how he navigated the tension between his advocacy of the New 
Republic and liberal imperialism.  
                                                          
2 Contextualist studies of modern British international thought include Ashworth (1999); Bell 







In the Beginning of a New Time: The Larger Synthesis  
 
During the 1890s arguments over Anglo-American relations moved to the centre of political 
discourse on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, the Venezuelan boundary dispute (1895-96) 
triggered acrimonious exchanges between Washington and London, although it also prompted 
many commentators to recoil from confrontation, and forge a transatlantic “rapprochement” 
(Adams 2005; Perkins 1968). The clamour for unity was partly a result of Washington’s new 
assertiveness, for although the United States had been engaged in violent territorial conquest 
since its founding, the annexation of Hawaii and the Spanish-American War, both in 1898, 
signalled its first sustained burst of extra-continental imperialism. Many observers, especially in 
Britain, argued that the two countries should co-operate closely, and some even foresaw a form 
of collaborative “Anglo-Saxon” imperialism, a joint shouldering of the global “civilizing 
mission.” Proposals for fortifying Anglo-American relations ranged from deepening informal 
cooperation, through a defensive alliance, to projects for formal political (re)unification (Bell 
2016, ch. 8).  
 
The rapprochement has long presented a puzzle for IR scholars interested in hegemonic 
transition. Assorted explanatory variable have been posited: democratic culture, liberal values, 
shared strategic and economic interests. But, as Srdjan Vucetic has argued, race was a key 
determinant (2011a, 2011b). Anglo-American cooperation, on this constructivist account, was 
“established on the basis of race, or, more specifically, because American and British elites 
succeeded in framing their community as a single Anglo-Saxon brotherhood” (Vucetic 2011b, 
403-404).3 It was a “racial peace.” While political elites on both sides of the Atlantic “understood 
                                                          
3 For an alternative explanations, see Kupchan (2012), ch. 3; Rock (1997). On the role of 
imperialism in early IR, see Long and Schmitt (2005); Schmidt (2005), ch. 3; Vitalis (2015). 
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each other as fellow democrats ... their antecedent ontology was always race, not regime type” 
(Vucetic 2011b, 413). Perceptions of shared interests and values were shaped and filtered by a 
sense of common racial identity. 
 
As the twentieth century dawned, Wells wrote a series of books and articles outlining a “New 
Republicanism” fit for a world in flux. The most significant was Anticipations. It offered a 
methodology for delineating the shape of things to come, a set of predictions about how existing 
trends would reshape the world, and normative arguments justifying the superiority of the future 
order. The consummation of the “English-speaking peoples” stood at the very core of Wells’s 
account. Proclaiming Anticipations the “first attempt to forecast the human future as a whole and 
to estimate the relative power of this and that great systems of influence,” Wells stated that the 
book comprised the “keystone to the main arch of my work” (2008, 643, 645), and he returned 
obsessively to its main themes throughout his career. 
 
Wells hoped that his bold vision of the future might seed ideas about the necessity of radical 
social change. In a performative vein, he thought that it might bring about the very changes he 
predicted. Pressing the novelist Arnold Bennett to help spread “my gospel,” he confided his 
belief that “a real first class boom and uproar and discussion about this book will do an infinite 
amount of good in the country.” Wells sought to reach a large audience, drawing the attention of 
“parsons and country doctors” as well as the denizens of the London literary scene.4 He 
achieved his goal: the book was a best-seller, elevating him to the top ranks of intellectual 
celebrity (on its reception, see Smith 1986, 92-5, 97ff). It established his reputation as a seer of 
modernity. Its huge success also had practical consequences for his career, opening doors for a 
lower-middle class writer, bringing him to the attention of leading thinkers and politicians, and 
prompting invitations to join some of the most significant campaigning organisations of the 
                                                          
4 Wells to Bennett, 25/11/1901, in Harris (1960), 68.  
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time, including the Fabian Society and the Co-efficients dining club. He was soon a leading 
figure in Edwardian intellectual life.  
 
In Anticipations Wells analysed how assorted social, political, and technological, processes were 
dissolving venerable patterns of power and privilege, and heralding unprecedented forms of 
political association and human subjectivity. The English-speaking people were both an agent 
and a product of change. The astonishing power of new transport and communications systems 
– the “distinctive feature of the nineteenth century” – propelled the argument. Altering the very 
conditions of human existence, “[m]echanism” had triggered more than a “mere” revolution, it 
had catalysed an “absolute release from the fixed condition about which human affairs circled.” 
The reconfiguration of space and time augured a fundamental shift in geopolitical ordering. 
Technology was “abolishing locality,” eliminating traditional conceptions of territoriality and 
political identity (Wells 1999, 3, 44, 122, 74). Wells was echoing a popular theme in fin de siècle 
political thought. Since the mid-nineteenth century, but especially from the 1880s onwards, the 
development of new communications technologies – above all the electrical telegraph and the 
ocean-traversing stream ship – had prompted intense speculation about the abolition of distance, 
the acceleration of social and political life, and the imperative to develop new models of 
international, imperial and global organisation (Bell 2007; Deudney 2008). Wells harnessed such 
concerns to his project for world-transformation. He argued that the enormous “synthetic” 
communities of the future would necessarily differ in form and scale from those of the past. 
“Mechanism” provided both the infrastructural means through which the world would be 
rebuild, and – in the elevation of scientific rationalism to a pervasive ideology – the basis for an 
ethos that would constitute new types of human and practices of rule. Parodying strains of 
contemporary utopianism, G. K. Chesterton painted Wells as the man who believed most 




The New Republic would be germinated by small groups of individuals. These embryonic New 
Republicans – an emergent technocratic class of “efficients” – would act as a largely un-
coordinated secret society, an “informal and open freemasonry,” gestating a new phase in human 
history. These groups would slowly coalesce, recognising a common purpose and need for 
collaborative action. Sooner or later, they would form a “functional social body” composed of 
(among others) scientists, engineers, teachers, administrators, and mangers (Wells 1999, 155, 81). 
Here Wells was channelling the obsession with “national efficiency” that gripped swathes of the 
British intelligentsia, fearful that the public and state administration alike were plagued by torpor 
and ineptitude (Searle 1971; Tonooka 2017). Rigorously planned, well-governed, and populated 
by highly-educated individuals, the New Republic would be a beacon of hyper-efficiency. 
However, Wells cautioned that the developmental process was beset with danger. The efficients 
would come into conflict with other social formations determined to halt their relentless march – 
the traditional landed aristocracy, the “helpless, superseded poor,” a social residuum he termed 
the “people of the Abyss,” and finally, “a possibly equally great number of non-productive 
persons living in and by social confusion” (Wells 1999, 56). The efficients would win out 
eventually, their greater organisational skills and intelligence guaranteeing victory.  
 
The role assigned to human agency in this epic of world-making was unclear. Wells frequently 
argued that the New Republic would only materialize if it was willed by enough people. It 
required dynamic leadership, assiduous planning, and effective mobilisation. Alive to the 
daunting technical challenges facing humanity, and keen to grasp the possibilities they heralded, 
the New Republicans would be consummate “artists in reality.” Their artistry combined two 
primary features: a desire for order, efficiency and simplicity yoked to a zealous commitment – 
embedded at the heart of their “ethical frame” – to construct a world-state (Wells 1999, 167). 
Fusing aesthetic sensibility and political vision, they would labour ceaselessly to reweave the 
threads of reality, transfiguring prevailing ideas about social order, political institutions, and the 
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ends of human life. This argument rested on Wells’s underlying ideational social theory, which 
posited that institutions and laws were crystallised beliefs, thus implying that a change in belief 
would invariably alter the institutional ecology (Bell 2017a). It followed that the principal role of 
the dedicated reformer was to convince people of the need to change patterns of belief.  
Elsewhere, however, Wells indicated that the new world would emerge regardless of human 
intervention, as a result of socio-technical developments “with all the inevitableness and all the 
patience of a natural force.” The “final attainment” of the larger synthesis, he wrote in this vein, 
appeared to be a process acting “independent of any collective or conscious will in man,” and it 
was “working now, and may work out to its end vastly, and yet at times almost imperceptibly, as 
some huge secular movement in Nature,” the equivalent of tectonic shifts in the earth’s crust or 
the annihilation of mountain ranges (Wells 1999, 139, 146-7). Here we see the clash between 
Wells’s scientific naturalism and the mysticism that permeated his political writings. However it 
was to be achieved, the result would be an order populated by a new type of human, their 
personalities attuned to perpetual technological change and novel forms of living, working, and 
thinking.  
 
The new time would be an age of vast omnicompetent political associations. Wells identified 
several “spacious movements of coalescence” as possible agents of future synthesis: Anglo-
Saxonism, the “allied but finally very different” ideology of British imperialism, Pan-German and 
Pan-Slavic groupings, and the “conception of a great union of the ‘Latin’ peoples.” He also 
predicted that the brutality meted out by the “white” powers would precipitate the unification of 
the “‘Yellow’ peoples’” of East Asia. Wells was far from alone in predicting a future dominated 
by massive pan-movements – in Imperialism, for example, the political economist J. A. Hobson 
discerned a world dominated by a handful of “great civilizational empires” (1997, 332). Yet Wells 
was sceptical about the likely success of most pan-movements. The pan-Slavic and the pan-Latin 
peoples were too weak and divided to form a durable polity. A Pan-Germanic movement was 
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feasible, not least because the Germans exhibited remarkable technological prowess and had the 
most “efficient” middles classes in Europe, but they were hamstrung by a political system at 
once too aristocratic and monarchical. They would fail to draw willing support for accession, 
meaning that a German attempt to conquer Europe entailed war with France to the West or 
Russia to the East. A more likely outcome, Wells foretold, was a negotiated compromise 
between the continental powers, leading to the creation of a federal European union (Wells 
1999, 143, 145).  
 
For Wells, the New Republican ideal would be best realised by the fusion of the United States 
and the British colonial empire. “A great federation of white English-speaking peoples,” he 
claimed, was both likely and desirable during the coming decades. It would reorder the world, 
bringing stability and spreading civilization. He thus articulated a vision of white supremacist 
global governance. Again emphasizing human agency, Wells contended that the main 
impediment to realizing the New Republic was a lack of “stimulus,” a political shock that would 
focus minds and motivate action, although he speculated that German naval expansion and the 
potential emergence of an East Asian synthesis might perform a catalytic role (Wells 1999, 146, 
145-6). However, Anticipations was no bombastic hymn to lasting British predominance, for Wells 
argued that the intramural balance of power was shifting westward, from London to 
Washington. The United States embodied the ideal of efficiency more successfully than Wells’s 
own countrymen. It was already pulling ahead economically, and political and military 
ascendancy would soon follow. Consequently, the “intellectual, political, and industrial centre of 
any permanent unification of the English-speaking states” would be located in a megalopolis that 
would sprawl between Chicago and the Atlantic. The future was likely to be Anglo-American.  
 
Anticipations was at once an exercise in sociological extrapolation, an example of social prophecy, 
and a pointed intervention in contemporary political controversy. The previous decade had 
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witnessed a wide-ranging debate over the possibility of Anglo-American union. It had begun in 
earnest in the early 1890s, and was bolstered by the fears of conflict over Venezuela and the 
subsequent “rapprochement.” Played out in literary periodicals, pamphlets, speeches, newspaper 
columns, and fictional narratives, it was given institutional support by a cluster of civil society 
associations that promoted Anglo-American cooperation. The campaign for unification 
represented, Wells argued, a “preliminary sigh before the stirring of a larger movement.” While 
he was sceptical of the effectiveness of the existing associations (Wells 1999, 147), he regarded 
them as a sign of things to come, a portent of synthesis. In Anticipations, he developed the most 
elaborate and theoretically-sophisticated account of Anglo-American union found at the time. 
 
Like most advocates of Anglo-American unity, Wells was unclear about the institutional 
structure of the future New Republic. He referred to a “federal government,” but alternated 
between calling it a “federation” and “confederation” (Wells 1999, 148, 146; 1903, 391).  
Recognising that knotty constitutional problems had to be surmounted, especially the clash 
between monarchical and republican models of government, he was blithely confident of 
success. In a panglossian vein, he argued that the New Republic would also resolve the vexed 
status of Ireland and South Africa, “two open sores of incorrigible wrong,” for while they would 
never be happy under the “vacillating, vote-caching incapacity of British Imperialism,” a 
federation of the English-speaking peoples would make it possible for them to achieve “equal 
fellowship,” thus removing the sources of bitterness and allowing them to flourish (Wells 1999, 
148-9). Generally loathe to cite other writers, Wells did endorse A. V. Dicey’s intriguing proposal 
for the creation of “isopolitan” citizenship: “the extension of common civil and political rights 
throughout the whole of the English-speaking people” (Dicey 1897, 458; Wells 1999, 148; Bell 
2014a). But whereas Dicey had proposed common citizenship as an ostensibly modest alternative 





Whatever institutional form the New Republic assumed, Wells argued that it would command a 
huge joint fleet and its population would exceed one hundred million. It would be the greatest 
empire in history, administering most of the existing British imperial territories, as well as much 
of the Caribbean, the Americas, the Pacific, and the “larger part of black Africa” (Wells 1999, 
146). Entrusted to an unprecedentedly large polity, and injected with an enervating dose of 
“efficiency,” the civilizing mission could finally be enacted on a global stage. This steroidal 
fantasy of universal imperium was the apotheosis of nineteenth century visions of empire as 
pedagogical technology, educating the backward peoples of the world until they were capable of 
self-government.  
 
Adamant that his vision of the future was no idle dream, Wells regarded the New Republican 
synthesis “not only as a possible, but as a probable, thing” (Wells 1999, 146). By the turn of the 
second millennium, it would be an achieved fact. However, Wells offered conflicting accounts of 
the political inflection of his prognostications. He wrote to one correspondent that it was the 
“prospectus of a new revolutionary movement,” while he boasted to another that it was 
“designed to undermine and destroy the monarchy, monogamy, faith in God & respectability & 
the British Empire, all under the guise of speculation about motor cars & electrical heating.”5 Yet 
he informed the radical journalist W. T. Stead, a fellow Anglo-American unionist, that the book 
was intended as “a sketch of a possible new Liberalism, that I have sufficient confidence to 
believe might very usefully supersede the chaotic good intentions that constitute contemporary 
Liberalism.” He made a similar point to Winston Churchill.6 Oscillation between audacious  
                                                          
5 Wells to Joseph Edwards, 7/11/01; Wells to Elizabeth Healey, 2/7/1901: Smith (1998), I, 383, 
379. 
6 Wells to Stead, 31/10/1901, cited in Baylen (1974), 61; Wells to Churchill, 19/11/01, Smith 
(1998), I, 457. 
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revolutionary claims and the profession of gradualism marked Wells’s political thinking at the 
time. It is perhaps best to read his work as trying (though often failing) to reconcile two temporal 
registers, a relatively modest liberal-socialist reformism aimed at influencing contemporary 
British debate and a hugely ambitious vision of world transformation that necessitated 
transcending the very world he was otherwise seeking to modify. It was often unclear how these 
could be rendered compatible. 
 
Some advocates of Angloworld consolidation saw it as the potential end of history, the terminal 
form of global political organization, while others regarded it as a transitional phase, a step on 
the road to a yet grander mode of political life. Wells fell squarely into the latter camp. He 
thought that the final stage of human political evolution – at least on earth – would be the 
creation of a universal world-state, a synthesis of the New Republic and the other predominant 
powers. The New Republic would be self-overcoming. By the year 2000, the English-speaking 
federation would most likely set in motion the incorporation of the European union and the 
“yellow state.” A fully-fledged universal polity would emerge only after at least another century 
had passed, though it might take as long as a thousand years (Wells 1999, 177; Wells 1902, 331). 
There was no guarantee that this process would be peaceful. The synthetic associations would 
battle for global domination unless or until their energies could be harmonised to create a higher 
unity (Wells 1999, 139). Although Wells had initially presented Anticipations as a work of 
scientifically-informed social prophecy, it ended as spirited advocacy, celebrating the virtues of 
the New Republic and the value of English-speaking leadership. As he confessed a few years 
later, “I had intended simply to work out and foretell, and before I had finished I was in a fine 
full blast of exhortation” (Wells 2016a, 17).  
 




As the new century broke the ideology of “Anglo-Saxonism” pervaded political discourse in the 
British empire and the United States (Horsman 1981), with many thinkers viewing race as the 
basic ontological category of politics, and the “Anglo-Saxons” as the most highly-developed 
racial group, ordained to dominate the world. White supremacist visions of global racial 
governance circulated widely, and played a formative role in the discipline of political science 
(Blatt 2018; Vitalis 2015). Most accounts of Anglo-American union were grounded in claims 
about racial kinship and superiority. Wells staked out a different position, arguing that language 
not race provided the foundations of the New Republic.  
 
Long fascinated by the nature and functions of language, Wells assigned it a pivotal role in his 
understanding of human evolution (Hardy 1991). Following T. H. Huxley, he argued that 
contemporary evolutionary pressures were fundamentally different from those that had originally 
produced humans (1975b, 211). Humanity, in all its manifold complexity, resulted from the 
fusion of natural and social forces. Modern “civilised man” was a synthesis of “natural man” and 
“artificial man,” the former a product of millennia of Darwinian natural selection, the latter 
moulded by  “tradition, suggestion, and reasoned thought” (1975a, 217). Wells argued that while 
the basic biological features of humanity were the same as those found in the Palaeolithic era, 
there had been innumerable changes in “suggestions and ideas.” The “artificial factor” had been 
“modified” by learning and the accumulation of knowledge (Wells 1975b, 211, 217). Language 
was central to the development of artificiality, the escape from brute nature. Writing and speech 
were fundamental features of social evolution. 
 
His most fully-developed account of the linguistic basis of the New Republic is found in 
Mankind in the Making. Much of the book was dedicated to “man-making,” sculpting citizens 
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suitable for the New Republic through improving education and child-rearing practices.7 Wells 
reiterated his support for the political consolidation of the “English-speaking community,” its 
teeming multitude of citizens then “scattered under various flags and governments throughout 
the world.” It was essential to comprehend the whole of this distributed polity, “unless our talk 
of co-operation, of reunion, is no more than sentimental dreaming” (Wells 1903, 34, vii). Once 
again, he argued that technological and political developments were tending towards the creation 
of a “new State,” a “great confederation” of  “republican communities” all “speaking a common 
language, possessing a common living body of literature and a common scientific and, in its 
higher stages at least, a common education organisation” (Wells 1903, 391). While there were 
significant political obstacles to overcome, he insisted that the underlying similarities between the 
communities were of yet greater significance (Wells 1903, 260, 266). “Until grave cause has been 
shown to the contrary,” he declaimed, “there is every reason why all men who speak the same 
language, think the same literature and are akin in blood and spirit, and who have arrived at the 
great constructive conception that so many minds nowadays are reaching, should entirely 
disregard these old separations” (Wells 1903, 27). The territorial boundaries dividing the English-
speaking peoples would be eradicated. It was vital to acknowledge that they were one people 
endowed with a common destiny, a community that “should become aware of itself collectively 
and should think as a whole” (Wells 1903, 361). 
 
Wells’s analysis of the New Republic was marked by spatial ambiguity. Despite opening and 
closing with an encomium to the English-speaking peoples, the bulk of Mankind in the Making 
refers only to Britain and the United States (Wells 1903, vii, 34). Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand were absent, as were Ireland and South Africa. Moreover, Wells never explained clearly 
the selection criteria for inclusion in the New Republic. As with many other Anglo-unionists, the 
exact boundaries of the future polity were left fuzzy.  
                                                          




He argued that the New Republic faced a major problem. The quality of written and spoken 
English displayed by its inhabitants, especially in the Colonies, was worryingly low. This 
hampered the “development of the racial consciousness,” which depended on clear and 
intelligible communication, facilitating the growth of a sophisticated public culture capable of 
sustaining and disseminating complex ideas. The “thought of a community,” he insisted, “is the 
life of that community,” and if that thought was underdeveloped, or “disconnected and 
fragmentary,” the result was weakness and division. “That does not constitute an incidental 
defect, but essential failure” (Wells 1903, 128, 390).  It was a feature, not a bug. Linguistic 
degeneration was, he cautioned the readers of Mankind in the Making, the “darkest cloud” hanging 
over potential confederation (Wells 1903, 131). It was essential to act before it was too late. 
 
We have to save, to revive this scattered, warped, tarnished and neglected language of 
ours, if we wish to save the future of our world. We should save not only the world of 
those who at present speak English, but the world of many kindred and associated 
peoples who would willingly enter into our synthesis, could we make it wide enough and 
sane enough and noble enough for their honour (Wells 1903, 135).  
 
Both the future of the New Republic and the World State depended on a significant 
improvement in the linguistic capacities – and thus the thought-worlds – of (white) English-
speakers. The answer, Wells argued, lay in standardizing language, eliminating the distracting 
cacophony of dialects, idioms and accents that beset interpersonal communication and cognitive 
development. The citizens of the New Republic needed to speak with “one accent, one idiom, 
and one intonation.” This was a “necessary preliminary” to the “complete attainment of the 
more essential nucleus in the new Republican idea” (Wells 1903, 136, 157). He outlined various 
projects for achieving this end. For example, he supported the campaign for “simplified 
17 
 
spelling,” seeking to alter the orthography of the language, and argued that more effort should be 
put into the systematic institutionalisation of knowledge. “Organized general literature” 
 
…would be the thinking department of the race. Once this deliberate organization of a 
central ganglion of interpretation and presentation began, the development of the brain 
and the nervous system in the social body would proceed apace. Each step would enable 
the next step by being wider and bolder. The general innervations of society with books 
and book distributing agencies would be followed by the linking up of the now almost 
isolated mental worlds of science, art, and political and social activity in a system of 
intercommunication and sympathy... (Wells 1903, 388).  
 
The technologies that helped to make union both practical and necessary – above all the “more 
highly evolved” forms of telegraph and phonograph – also provided the means for improving 
language, chiefly through the rapid dissemination of information (Wells 1903, 137). This process 
would produce a “Collective Mind.”  
 
Utopian energies pulsed through the racial discourses of the time, with Anglo-American union 
often hailed as an instrument of global justice and perpetual peace (Bell 2014b, 2017b).8 
Moreover, the line between science fiction – then emerging as a popular medium for both 
critiquing the present and envisioning assorted futures – and dreams of the Angloworld-to-come, 
was often blurred, the fictional and non-fictional discourses interpenetrating. In particular, both 
emphasised the revolutionary potential of technology, its ability to reshape social structures, 
geopolitical alignments, and human subjectivity. Imaginative renderings of future Anglo-
American unification and global domination – often in the wake of cataclysmic war – were a 
prominent feature of late Victorian and Edwardian science fiction on both sides of the Atlantic. 
                                                          
8
 For an interesting discussion of popular culture and politics, see Furman and Musgrave (2017). 
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Although Wells did not write the New Republic into any of his novels, Anticipations and Mankind 
in the Making figured the electrical telegraph as animating the living body of the new polity, 
generating a form of distributed cognition, even consciousness, among its scattered elements. 
They can be read as contributions to the science fiction of empire. He conjured up the vision of 
a cyborg imperium – a translocal fusion of humans and machines, acting as a single entity and 
endowed with a form of agency, poised to order and rule the world.  
 
Wells rejected the racial theories on which most accounts of Anglo-American union were based. 
In A Modern Utopia, published in 1905, Wells warned that “the world is in a sort of delirium 
about race and the racial struggle,” a delirium legitimated by a “vast edifice of sham science” 
(Wells 2005a, 218, 224).9 This had to be confronted, for it underwrote some of the worst 
problems facing humanity. This error took different forms. Some thinkers assumed that there 
was a “best race,” and regarded all others as inferior, even as “material for extermination.” 
Dreaming of Weltpolitik, stern German professors asserted the superiority of the “Teuton,” while 
their British equivalent, Cecil Rhodes – himself an enthusiastic Anglo-American unionist 
(Rhodes 1902) – “affected that triumph of creative imagination,” the “Anglo-Saxon race.” Such 
racial supremacism augured a world of death and destruction. For those aiming to establish a 
“Welt-Apparat” – a “global police machine” – it was a “perfectly sound and reasonable policy,” 
but it would necessitate “national harrowing and reaping machines, and race-destroying 
fumigations” (Wells 2005a, 229). The climacteric of Rhodes’s politics, Wells suggested, was 
genocide enacted on a global scale.  
 
Even if one “race” did manage to predominate, Wells continued, it would then subdivide into 
competing factions, and conflict would begin anew. It was an invitation to perpetual war. While 
such “scientific Welt-Politik” was a relatively marginal idea, Wells contended that the modern 
                                                          
9 On fin de siècle British racial discourses is Lorimer (2013). 
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imperialist school was far more influential. It was possible to distinguish variations on the theme: 
German, British and Anglo-Saxon, as well as a “wider teaching which embraces the whole ‘white 
race.’” Proponents of each identified their own “race” as the chosen one, looking “with a 
resolute, truculent, but slightly indistinct eye to a future in which all the rest of the world will be 
in subjection to those elect” (Wells 2005a, 229-30). Wells cited Benjamin Kidd’s Control of the 
Tropics (1898) as exemplary. Kidd had argued that the “childish” peoples of the world could not 
be entrusted with the economic development of the untapped resources of the tropics, and that 
the task should be assigned to the advanced “white states,” which would administer the land for 
the benefit of humanity.  
 
Wells argued that contemporary racial theory was derived from a dangerous combination of 
speculative philology and misappropriated evolutionary biology (Bell 2017a). In Anticipations, he 
had scorned the “oil-lamp anthropology” of those “[u]nobservant, over-scholarly people” who 
“talk or write in the profoundest manner about a Teutonic race and a Keltic race” (Wells 1999, 
124, 123). He later blamed the influential philologist Max Müller for inspiring the misguided 
search for a “new political synthesis in adaptable sympathies based on linguistic affinities,” a 
search that had spawned numerous celebratory stories of English Teutonism (2005a, 218; see 
also 1907b, 383). Yet for Wells this philological theory was premised on the “unaccountable 
assumption” that language “indicated kindred,” that the linguistic structures apparently shared by 
the Indo-Europeans identified a common “Teutonic” racial descent (2005a, 218). This argument 
informed many projects for Anglo-American union. Müller’s work also underpinned the 
“comparative method” propagated by a raft of prominent historians and anthropologists, 
including Henry Maine, Edward Augustus Freeman, and J. R. Seeley, that did so much to shape 
the late nineteenth-century academic disciplines of political science and history (Burrow, Collini 




Although Wells was firmly committed to a Huxleyean understanding of evolution (Huxley 1989a, 
1989b; Wells 1901, 1975a; Hale 2014, ch. 6), he deprecated the widespread abuse of Darwinian 
insights by contemporary political thinkers. They traded in a “bastard science” (Wells 2005a, 
219), justifying their positions by appeals to authority that often bore little relation to 
contemporary scientific opinion. Wells’s philosophical commitments reinforced the latest 
findings of the biologists. Scholars of his international and imperial ideology have missed this 
aspect of his work, yet it is vital for understanding his political thought. During the opening years 
of the century he expounded an idiosyncratic form of philosophical pragmatism, indebted 
heavily to William James (Bell, 2017a, 2018). At the core of his philosophical vision was a 
nominalist metaphysics that issued in severe scepticism about the truth-value of classification. 
During the early Edwardian years Wells elaborated this argument in a series of philosophical 
works, most thoroughly in “Scepticism of the Instrument” (1904), and utilised it to intervene in 
debates over the methodology of social science (Wells 1907a; Bell 2017a). Nominalism 
underwrote his scepticism about race. The pragmatist philosophy of the unique, he argued in A 
Modern Utopia, demonstrated that the “mania” for race was fundamentally misguided. Races were 
“no hard and fast things, no crowd of identically similar persons,” but instead “massed sub-races 
and tribes and families each after its kind unique, and these again are clusterings of still smaller 
uniques and so down to each several person” (2005a, 220, 23; see also 2016b, 67). Here Wells 
invoked both methodological and ontological individualism. Human groups were no more than 
the sum of their parts. Since all persons were “individualized,” he rejected the claim that racial 
differences were inherent and “insurmountable” (Wells 2005a, 221).  
 
Yet despite his explicit rejection of racial theorising, Wells’s early work presented a racialized 
picture of the New Republic. Although he grounded his vision of an emergent polity on 
linguistic  foundations, it was very hard to practically distinguish from explicitly racial accounts 
of the English-speaking peoples or Anglo-Saxondom: it drew from the same stock of images, 
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terms, and conceptual resources. Moreover, his constant resort to charged racial markers – and 
in particular his tendency to classify polities as “white,” “yellow,” and “black” – highlighted an 
inability to escape the dominant interpretive frameworks shaping perceptions of the world. 
Moreover, even as he rejected racial classification, Wells reaffirmed a Eurocentric developmental 
account, one in which societies were assigned a place in a hierarchy at the top of which resided 
the advanced (“efficient”) Europeans and Americans, who were given the role of helping 
backward peoples to reach their immanent potential. Ultimately, then, Wells offered a distinctive 
variation on the theme of liberal imperialism.  
 
American Pathologies  
 
In April 1906 Wells visited the United States for the first time. He collected his thoughts in The 
Future in America, a popular addition to the genre of travelogues that attempted to divine the 
inner essence of the country (Frankel 2007; Seed 2016). Widely regarded as embodying the 
future, the United States was viewed as both laboratory and template for social change. It was 
one of his most successful books. William James informed Wells that it was as “good a service as 
a foreigner has ever performed.”10 Franklin Giddings, one of the leading sociologists in the 
United States, was even more effusive: “It is a wonderfully true book, and I am deeply thankful 
that you have said to the American people all the things which it contains. As a general 
sociological description of the essentials of a big national society this study is immeasurably the 
best thing that has ever been done by anybody.”11 While these judgements exaggerate the quality 
of Wells’s book, they highlight the esteem in which many held him.  
 
                                                          
10 James to Wells, December 4 1906, in James (2003), XI, 290.  
11 Giddings to Wells, 6/2/1906, Wells papers, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.  
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The Future in America marked an important, but unacknowledged, shift in Wells’s account of 
future global order. While he reiterated his view that Britain and the United States were bound 
together by a shared history and destiny, he silently dropped his backing for synthesis. “Our 
future is extraordinarily bound up in America’s and in a sense dependent upon it,” but not, he 
maintained, because “we dream very much of political reunions of Anglo Saxondom and the 
like” (Wells 2016a, 22).  It was as if he had never written Anticipations or Mankind in the Making. 
Wells glided from impassioned prophecy-cum-endorsement to outright rejection, without 
flagging the move for his readers. Nor did the Larger Synthesis warrant a mention in Wells’s 
other major political writings of the pre-war era, including New Worlds for Old, First and Last Things 
or his extended essay on “The Great State” (1912). He had moved on.  
 
The answer to this puzzle, I want to suggest, lies chiefly in what Wells learned from his travels 
around the United States. He went in search of America’s dream of the future but was 
underwhelmed by what he found. The key to American destiny, like that of any country, was the 
coherence and quality of its national will (2016a, 19). He travelled there, he informed his readers, 
“to find whatever consciousness or a common purpose there may be,” and to ask, 
… what is their Vision, their American Utopia, how much will there is shaping to attain 
it, how much capacity goes with the will – what, in short, there is in America, over and 
above the mere mechanical consequences of scattering multitudes of energetic 
Europeans athwart a vast healthy, productive and practically empty continent in the 
temperate zone (Wells 2016a, 21).  
Wells never defined national will clearly, nor discussed how it could be measured, but the quest 
for this elusive property shadowed his visit and shaped his conclusions. Writing aboard the 
ocean-liner Carmania as she hurtled across the Atlantic to New York, Wells confessed that in 
researching his trip he had struggled to find an idea of the future animating American life (Wells 
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2016a, 21, 22-3).12 This indictment was amply confirmed during his travels. The Future in America 
is as much a study of disenchantment as of celebration. The United States was thriving 
economically, and Wells was awed by the scale and tempo of change, but the social conditions, 
the political system, and the intellectual life of the country, were all worryingly defective. This 
diagnosis, I contend, had deep implications for Wells’s account of future geopolitics.  
 
The overriding problem was that the United States promoted a hyper-competitive capitalist 
ethos rooted in extreme individualism and motivated by worship of private property. This 
simultaneously drove the motor of change and threatened to undermine the epochal promise of 
the country. “Property becomes organized, consolidated, concentrated and secured. This is the 
fact to which America is slowly awakening at the present time.” In a system based on democratic 
equality, lacking a landed aristocracy and a proletariat, unrestrained capitalism generated a 
massive concentration of wealth. This dynamic threatened the very foundations of society (Wells 
2016a, 77, 78). The fabled robber barons, Astor, Morgan, Rockefeller, and Carnegie, stood at the 
apex of this bloated system, accumulating unimaginable riches at the expense of the poor. It is 
little wonder that Wells sympathised with the Progressives fighting the obscene excesses of the 
Gilded Age, or that many leading Progressive thinkers embraced him as an inspiration and ally 
(Bell 2017a).  
 
Wells was struck by the diversity of the American population, but he maintained that its vibrant 
core was descended from British colonists. While the “typical” American was “nowhere and 
everywhere,” Wells insisted that “he” was nevertheless an “English-speaking person, with 
extraordinary English traits still, in spite of much good German and Scandinavian and Irish 
blood he has assimilated.” But dangers abounded. Some of the most despondent – and racist – 
                                                          
12 Wells cited assorted sources for his research, including Thodore Roosevelt, Thorstein Veblen, 
Moisey Ostrogorsky, and the psychologist Hugo Munsterberg (2016a, 112). 
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passages in The Future in America concerned the threat of unchecked immigration. They reflected 
on one of the most fiercely contested debates in American politics, characterised by vicious 
hostility to immigrants from East Asia, eastern Europe, and Ireland (Lake & Reynolds 2008; 
Vitalis 2015). Wells argued that the United States was foolishly admitting huge numbers of 
peasants from Central and Eastern Europe, and transmuting them “into a practically illiterate 
industrial proletariat.” Uneducated, uncivilized, and poorly disciplined – inefficient – the teeming 
masses threatened social stability and political destiny. Crowded in festering slums, they were 
easily manipulated by machine politicians, their sheer numbers stoking ethnic tensions and 
undercutting wages. The country faced an urgent choice: improve the machinery of assimilation 
or close the border (Wells 2016a, 109, 132). Although Wells emphasised “efficiency” rather than 
“race,” his arguments dovetailed with nativism. Unsurprisingly, he was praised by supporters of 
tighter immigration restrictions (e.g. Auerbach 1907, 292-301; Warne 1913).   
 
The social crisis precipitated by mass immigration was amplified by other vices. He worried that 
political myopia hobbled the American system. In particular, Wells diagnosed a pervasive “state-
blindness” – a lack of a “sense of the state.” Despite their assertive patriotism, the typical 
American (male) citizen failed to understand that “his business activities, his private 
employments, are constituents in a large collective process; that they affect other people and the 
world forever, and cannot, as he imagines, begin and end with him” (Wells 2016a, 140; Wells, 
2008, 111, 245). As Charles Merriam glossed the idea, which was widely adopted by writers in the 
United States, Wells meant that Americans lacked “political consciousness and interest expressed 
in political action for the commonweal” (1920, 386-7). This blinkered individualism 
simultaneously fuelled the hyper-competitive capitalist economy and produced the inequality and 
social anomie that threatened its very existence. Francis Coker, a young political theorist, 
commended Wells for pinpointing the lack of imagination displayed by American elites (1914, 
xiii). For Wells, such intellectual failures damaged the political culture. Intelligence, and especially 
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“intelligence inspired by constructive passion,” was the “hero” of the “confused drama of 
human life” (2016a, 184). State-blindness was an impediment to enlightenment, to recognizing 
both the ills of the contemporary world and strategies for overcoming them. I would argue that 
the implications of Wells’s argument for a future New Republic and world state were clear. The 
United States was a poor candidate for leading the effort to fabricate either of them. It was not 
(yet) ready to engage in the epic task of building globe-spanning political associations.  
 
Despite all of these problems, Wells maintained that the United States was still the best hope for 
the future of humanity. Because of the “sheer virtue of its size, its free traditions, and the habit 
of initiative of its people,” it was and would remain the indispensable nation, and with it the 
“leadership of progress must ultimately rest” (2016a, 230). It was both synthesis and microcosm: 
a fecund synthesis of peoples and languages carving out an ever-greater role in the world and a 
microcosm of what may eventually supersede the parochial nation-state. Yet absent a fully-
developed sense of the state, this would remain more an immanent potentiality than an imminent 
probability.  
 
Civiliser-General: The Value of Empire 
 
In 1914 Wells added a new preface to the English edition of Anticipations. Expressing pleasure at 
how well the book had lasted, he restated his New Republican prophecy. “The whole of that 
chapter, the Larger Synthesis, has stood the wear of fourteen years remarkably well. For the most 
part it might have been written yesterday.” He would change very little if he started afresh (1999, 
xiii, xiv). Listing a series of errors and miscalculations in the text, Wells was happy to 
acknowledge faults with the work of his earlier self. Yet Anglo-American union was not among 





How can this reaffirmation be squared with his position in The Future in America? The answer, I 
argue, can be found in his views on empire and on time. Visiting the United States had 
highlighted the substantial differences between the English-speaking polities, as well as their 
conflicting attitudes to empire. This precluded synthesis in the near future. In the long-run, 
however, such differences could be overcome – whether through irresistible social forces 
working their providential magic or by concerted human action – and the English-speaking 
peoples would fuse into a single political community. The synthesis was pushed deeper into the 
future. In the meantime, the British empire offered both a vehicle for helping to civilise the 
world and a template for a world state. 
 
During the Edwardian years Wells threw himself into the maelstrom of imperial debate. Like 
many radicals, he was ambivalent about the value of imperial rule (Bell 2016; Morefield 2014). 
Some of his best-known fictional writings have been read as imperial critique – The War of the 
Worlds, after all, opens with the genocide of the Tasmanians and encouraged its readers to have 
“pity for those witless souls that suffer our dominion” (1898, 249). China Miéville, meanwhile, 
construes The First Men in the Moon as an anti-imperialist parable (2005, xx-xxiv).  But it is a 
mistake to view his early work as evidently anti-imperialist.13 During the years in which he made 
a name for himself as an author of scientific romances, he defended a variant of liberal 
imperialism, and sought to reform and prolong the British empire. Empire, he argued, possessed 
instrumental not intrinsic value. It was legitimate only insofar as it helped to realize a vitally 
important goal: the supersession of the system of states and the creation of a universal political 
order. If and when it stopped being useful, it would need to be replaced. Empire was, as he put it 
in his autobiography, “a convenience and not a God” (2008, 765). Prior to the First World War, 
                                                          
13 For conflicting accounts of imperialism in Wells’s fiction, see Worth (2010), Deane (2014), ch. 
7; Parrinder (1995), 65-80. 
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Wells was torn between a patriotic impulse to defend the British empire, a visionary enthusiasm 
for imperium as a model of post-sovereign political order, and disdain for imperial greed and 
hubris.  
 
The future of the empire was a topic of fierce debate during the Edwardian years (Cain 1996; 
Howe 191-274; Morefield 2004). At times it occupied the very centre of political life, most 
notably when in 1903 Joseph Chamberlain, the Tory Secretary of State for the Colonies, initiated 
his controversial tariff reform campaign. Politicians and intellectuals from across the spectrum 
joined the fray. Their attention focused principally, as it had for their late Victorian predecessors, 
on the setter empire – on “Greater Britain” (Bell 2007). Most of those favouring consolidation 
endorsed one or other version of “imperial federation.” As with the debate over Anglo-
American union, which was parasitic on the earlier discourse, imperial federalism encompassed a 
broad spectrum of plans, ranging from greater informal co-ordination to dreams of a globe-
straddling nation-state. By 1900, the debate seemed exhausted, with the Imperial Federation 
League disbanded, and its heirs fighting over the best way to proceed. It was given fresh impetus 
by Chamberlain’s program, and then by the insistent promotion of an imperial federal 
“commonwealth” by the Round Table group (Kendle 1975; May 1995; Morefield 2014, ch 3).  
 
The Fabian Society, which Wells had joined in 1903, was the most pro-imperial of the British 
socialist organisations of the time. A majority of its leading members – including Sidney Webb 
and George Bernard Shaw – sanctioned imperialism of one kind or another.14 However, the 
Society did not speak with one voice on the topic, and its members disagreed over assorted 
imperial issues. Wells’s Fabian work focused principally on domestic social and political reform. 
The main forum for testing and refining his views on empire was the “Co-efficients Club.” 
                                                          
14 Of the Fabians, Wells’s views on empire were closest to those of Sydney Olivier. On Wells’s 
fraught relationship with the Fabians, see Smith (1986), ch. 4; Partington (2008), 522-33. On 
Fabian international and imperial thought, see Wilson (2003); Claeys (2010), 180-98. 
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Established in 1902 by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, it was envisaged as the “Brains Trust” for a 
new political party committed to improving national efficiency, though it soon morphed into a 
high-powered discussion group (Semmel 1960, 81).15 Invitations were extended to a dozen 
prominent individuals, including Leopold Amery, Bertrand Russell, Halford Mackinder, Leo 
Maxse, William Pember Reeves, William Hewins, Lord Robert Cecil, and Lord Haldane. Wells 
was a founding member. While there was some overlap with the Fabians, the group was 
dominated by Tory imperial reformers. Sidney Webb informed Wells that they planned to 
address “the aims, policy and methods of Imperial Efficiency at home and abroad” (Harrison 
2000, 327). Wells later recalled that the monthly meetings of the group in 1902 and 1903 had 
probed the “future of this perplexing, promising and frustrating Empire of ours,” and that they 
played “an important part in my education” (Wells 2008, 761).  
 
There was widespread agreement among the Co-efficients on the need to consolidate the British 
colonial empire, though they diverged over questions of imperial economic organisation and 
defence.16 In March 1903 the group discussed Anglo-American relations. The minutes, penned 
by Amery and Mackinder, document a wide-ranging debate, recording that “it was generally 
concluded that circumstances would ultimately bring about some form of Anglo-Saxon union,” 
though this was not imminent. Obstacles persisted; patience was necessary. They finished by 
noting that the group was split between supporters of an active policy to encourage union, and 
those professing caution.17 The general consensus about the future signals how widespread belief 
in union was at the time.   
 
                                                          
15 Informal groups were central to imperial debate in Edwardian Britain (Thompson 2000). 
16
 Co-efficient Minute book, 1902-3, Assoc-17, London School of Economics and Political 
Science. 
17 16/3/1903, Co-efficient Minute book, 1902-3, 3. It is likely Wells was one of those pushing an 
active policy.  
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In January 1905 Wells presented a paper to the Club, asking “What Part are the Coloured Races 
Destined to Play in the Future Development of Civilisation?” It illustrates both his critique of 
prevailing accounts of race and his failure to escape the assumptions of the position he aimed to 
reject. Wells opened by defining civilization as the achievement of peace, first between 
individuals and then between polities. This argument provoked numerous objections. In 
particular, it was asserted that many of the most civilised states had been bellicose, and some of 
the least civilised – the “Australian black fellow,” for example – were peaceful. Civilization, the 
majority of his audience contended, was better understood as a combination of material 
abundance and organisational sophistication. Wells ploughed on, rejecting the “biologic-
evolutionary” idea that there were intrinsic differences between races. Existing inequalities, he 
maintained, could be explained by structural variables, and in principle they could be overcome. 
However, Wells still distinguished between “coloured” races that were capable of contributing to 
civilization on an equal basis with the “white” races, and those that would have to contribute in a 
different manner: “even if deficient in brainpower, some of these races posses physical 
characteristics which might render them, either pure or interbred with higher races, the only 
possible basis of civilization in certain parts of the world.”18 Those places and races were left 
unnamed, but the image Wells conjured up was a familiar one, the peoples of the world arrayed 
in a developmental hierarchy, with those at the top duty-bound to help those below them. This 
was a conventional liberal imperial narrative, fleshed out with an unorthodox account of 
civilization and a scathing critique of racial science.  
 
Wells was on friendly terms with some of the leading imperial ideologues of the day. His closest 
interlocutor was Amery, a prominent journalist turned political campaigner. Originally a Fabian, 
Amery soon drifted into the orbit of the Tory social-imperialists under the spell of Alfred 
                                                          
18
 “What Part are the Coloured Races Destined to Play in the Future Development of 
Civilisation?” 18/01/1905, Co-efficient Minute book, 1904-5, 1-4. 
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Milner.19 In his satirical novel of 1911, The New Machiavelli, Wells cast him as Crupp, a progressive 
Tory devoted to both domestic reform and empire. For “persons like ourselves,” Amery wrote 
to Wells in September 1903, it made sense to “get our Imperialism independent of Tory party 
politics.”20 The future of the empire was too important to be left to the vicissitudes of party 
political conflict. The two men had much in common. “Our minds certainly worked very much 
alike in many ways,” Amery observed later, “and for some years we saw a good deal of each 
other” (1953, 223). He marvelled at Wells’s extraordinary insight into technological 
developments, and the fertility of his imagination, though he rejected his scientific rationalism 
(1953, 225-26). As Wells recognised, his dream of an English-speaking New Republic resonated 
strongly with the “constructive” imperialism of Milner and Amery. In a self-reflective moment in 
First and Last Things, he acknowledged that the New Republicans of Anticipations and Mankind in 
the Making were less a desirable ideal than an extrapolation of existing political trends (Wells 
2016b, 114). “Most of the people who have written to me to call themselves New Republicans,” 
he observed, “are I find also Imperialists and Tariff Reformers,” and of his contemporaries, 
those who best approximated the model were Milner “and the Socialist-Unionists of his group,” 
men who were as “a type harshly constructive, inclined to an unscrupulous pose and slipping 
into a Kiplinesque brutality” (Wells 2016b, 115). The young Winston Churchill was another 
devotee, and his later promotion of the “English-speaking peoples” owed much to the 
inspiration of Wells (Toye 2008). 
 
Wells’s most detailed Edwardian account of the subject, “Cement of Empire,” was published in 
Everybody’s Weekly in 1911. He defended an idealized liberal vision of the British empire. In doing 
so, he diverged from his former co-efficient colleagues. Hewins, Maxse, Amery, Milner and 
Mackinder, for example, all supported Chamberlain’s program. Indeed Hewins, the political 
                                                          
19 On Amery, see Faber (2007); Louis (1992), 29-75. Faber describes Wells as Amery’s regular 
“sparring partner” (311).  
20
 Amery to Wells, [???] Wells papers, A108-1. 
31 
 
economist of the group, was arguably the key influence on Chamberlain’s conversion to tariff 
reform (Wood 1983, ch. 9).21 Wells demurred. Nor was he attracted to the view that imperial 
federation could serve a vehicle for realizing a radical liberal (even socialist) political agenda, a 
view promoted, at one time or another, by J. A. Hobson, L. T. Hobhouse, Keir Hardie and H. 
M. Hyndman (Claeys 2010, 207-9). Some even saw it as a template for a future post-Westphalian 
order. Thus in 1911 Hobhouse stated that it was “a model, and that on no mean scale, of the 
International State” (1994, 116). Wells was unconvinced.  
 
Wells contended that the empire was a fortuitous product of accident and individual endeavour, 
rather than coherent government policy. “The normal rulers of Britain never planned it; it 
happened almost in spite of them” (Wells 1911, 38). It was less a vehicle of conquest than of 
“colonisation and diplomacy.” (Given Wells’s earlier acknowledgment of the fate of the 
Tasmanians, it is striking that he did not regard colonisation as a form of violent conquest). 
Echoing a common trope, he maintained that the British empire was unprecedented. “Essentially 
it is an adventure of the British spirit, sanguine, discursive, and beyond comparison, 
insubordinate, adaptable, and originating” (1911, 33, 37-8; on this trope, see Bell 2016, chs. 2 & 
5). Aligning himself with those who “desire its continuance,” he launched an attack on projects 
for imperial preference and an integrated imperial defence system, arguing that they were gravely 
flawed. They shared the same weakness as all plans for imperial federation: there was little that 
united the “incurably scattered, various and divided” empire. It faced no common foe to catalyse 
a sense of common purpose. Wells argued that if it was understood properly, and if it acted to 
improve the lives of its subjects, it could and should endure. He said little about institutional 
innovation, implying that he thought the existing governance structure was suitable. “It is to the 
                                                          
21 In the 1950s Russell mistakenly recalled that he and Wells were the only non-imperialist Co-




free consent and participation of its constituent peoples that we must look for its continuance” 
(Wells 1911, 37, 34).  
 
It is a living thing that has arisen, not a dead thing put together. Beneath the thin legal 
and administrative ties that hold it together lies the far more vital bond of a traditional 
free spontaneous activity. It has a common medium of expression in the English 
tongue, a unity of liberal and tolerant purpose amidst its enormous variety of localized 
life and colour. And it is in the developing and strengthening, the enrichment, the 
rendering more conscious and more purposeful, of that broad creative spirit of the 
British that the true cement and continuance of our Empire is to be found (1911, 38). 
 
If it was to be anything, the empire had to be a liberal civilizing force. The English language was 
fundamental to its resilience. Since language was an agent of civilization, the empire had to 
become the “medium of knowledge and thought to every intelligent person in it” (1911, 39). It 
was to become a vast cyborg technology for the progressive education of humanity. Although his 
discussion of institutional reform was vague, Wells’s commitment to liberal imperialism was 
clear.  
 
However, there were serious obstacles to realizing the full potential of empire. To become 
“civiliser-general,” it had to be governed by an enlightened administration and overseen by 
politicians who understood its true value. Instead, it was endangered by the “intellectual 
inertness” of those entrusted to rule, the “commonplace and dull-minded leaders” (Wells 1911, 
39, 40-1). This was a recurrent theme in Wells’s Edwardian writings. His searing reflections on 
deficiencies in the British education system were inflected by a concern that schools were 
incapable of producing citizens and leaders equipped to pursue the imperial mission. He 
lambasted private schools for manufacturing docile, unimaginative drones. “I submit this may be 
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a very good training for polite servants, but it is not the way to make masters in the world” 
(1905, 227). The incompetence of the imperial class even threatened the settler empire, as people 
in Australia, Canada and New Zealand had already begun to turn to the United States for ideas 
and inspiration (Wells 2016b, 42). Moreover, a successful liberal empire required its citizens to 
behave in a civilized manner. This too was lacking. In The Future in America, Wells had castigated 
the vicious racism of white southerners in the United States. His compatriots were no better. 
British settlers living in the Cape, for example, exhibited the same deplorable attitude: “the dull 
prejudice; the readiness to take advantage of the ‘boy’; the utter disrespect for colored 
womankind; the savage, intolerant resentment, dashed dangerously with fear, which the native 
arouses in him” (2016a, 169, 170). Fully realizing the potential of the British empire required 
substantial change. It was threatened by the very people who hymned its virtues the loudest.  
 
The empire, then, was worth saving. However, this created a problem for Wells, because British 
imperialism was a bar to union with the United States. When he was composing Anticipations, 
Washington seemed ready to embark on a policy of overseas expansion, perhaps in conjunction 
with the British. An era of Anglo-American inter-imperialism beckoned. Cementing ties between 
the polities would accelerate the creation of a New Republic. The vast new polity would properly 
fulfil the role of Civiliser-General, educating the world’s peoples for their eventual integration 
into the world-state. Yet by the time Wells visited the United States in 1906, he sensed that 
imperial enthusiasm had cooled. The Americans were even ready to shed the Philippines “at as 
early a date as possible” (Wells 2016a, 111). Wells recognised that future American political 
development would fall principally within continental bounds, while the British remained 
wedded to their imperial project. “So long as we British retain our wide and accidental sprawl of 
empire across the earth we cannot expect or desire the Americans to share our stresses and 
entanglements” (Wells 2016, 22). Given the position of the British empire, and the current 
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failings of the United States, it made sense to temporarily prioritise the improvement of the 
former over reintegration with the latter. The New Republic had to be deferred. 
 
Conclusion: Towards Cosmopolis 
Wells was one of the most influential theorists of global order during the first half of the 
twentieth century. He made his name as a social and political commentator during the 
Edwardian years, his work attracting the attention of a huge audience throughout the world, and 
drawing praise from some of the leading political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and 
politicians of the day. Tracing the early development of his ideas about empire, race and the 
world state, sheds light on an important contributor to modern international and imperial 
political thought. 
 
Wells’s Edwardian writings explored two possible institutional foundations for the world-state. It 
might be built on the back of the British empire or through Anglo-American union. Initially, 
Wells believed that the two models could be fused together, but it soon became apparent that 
this was unrealistic. They pulled in different directions. Anticipations looked a century into the 
future, whereas The Future in America scanned a closer horizon. In the former, Wells had been 
sanguine that Britain and the United States were sufficiently alike to merge seamlessly together 
into a “Larger Synthesis.” The latter expressed a more cautious outlook. His transatlantic visit 
convinced him that Washington was turning away from overseas imperialism and that the 
ubiquity of “state-blindness” rendered the country unfit to shoulder the burden of state-building 
on a global scale. Wells thought that the tension could be resolved through the medium of time. 
The unrelenting processes transforming the world would eradicate or transcend the obstacles to 
union in due course. The shared identity of the English-speaking polities was more fundamental 
than their differences, and it trumped disputes over imperial rule. “[O]ur civilization,” he 
proclaimed in The Future in America, “is a different thing from our Empire, a thing that reaches 
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further into the future,” and Americans were part “of our community, are becoming indeed the 
larger part of our community of thought and feeling and outlook,” and this was far more 
“intimate than any link we have with Hindoo or Copt or Cingalese” (2016a, 22-3). The English-
speaking peoples would unite eventually, constituting the vanguard of the world-state.  
 
In the short-term, however, the British empire – at least if governed properly – could serve as a 
“civiliser-general,” combating ignorance and spreading progressive institutions and values. In 
doing so, it could help to dissolve nationalism and prepare people throughout the world for the 
emergence of a new universal order. The “precursor of a world-state or nothing” (2008, 765), it 
was a self-dissolving enterprise. In the following years, Wells’s thinking on global order 
continued to develop, and he became increasingly hostile to the empire, but he never lost his 
fascination with the English-speaking peoples, nor his fervent belief that they were fated to 
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